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1-6 DDI	7-12 D/OCI	13-17 DDI STAFF	18-22 OD/OCI STAFF	23,24 MCO
DCI		25 D/ONE	39 DCI Briefers	
DDCI		26-28 PICI	40,41 INDICO	
EXEC. REG.		29-37 OPSCEN		
EXEC. DIR.		38 DDP Duty Ofcr.	25X1A	
42,43 D/NIPE		-2 84	[REDACTED]	-1
44 G. COUNS	25X1A	-1 85	[REDACTED]	-1
45 I.G.		-1 86	SA/R	-1
46,47 DD/S&T		-2 87,88	[REDACTED]	-2
48 DD/S&T	[REDACTED]	-1 89,90	[REDACTED]	-2
49-61 DDP (RI/DI) (COLLATERAL)		-13 91,92	[REDACTED]	-2
		93,94	[REDACTED]	-2
62 DIR/PPB		-1 95	[REDACTED]	-1
63-65 ONE	25X1A	-3 96-98	CS/Pres 25X1A	-3
66-70 D/ORR (CSS)		-5 99	ADMIN (VM)	-1
71-75 D/OSI		-5 100	[REDACTED]	-1
76,77 D/OCR (SR/OCR)		-2 101,102	Orig. Div.	-2
78-80 DIR/NPIC (LS/PID)		-3 103,104	Orig. Br.	-2
81 DDI/CGS		-1		
82 DDI/RS		-1		
83 [REDACTED]	25X1A	-1	25X1A	

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## INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SOVIET BLOC PROPOSALS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY: A RESUME

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
22 June 1966

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM\*

Soviet Bloc Proposals on European Security: A Resumé

Summary

For more than a decade, the Soviet Union has put forth or supported European security proposals designed above all to stall Western plans to increase the military strength of West Germany (FRG). The record reveals that efforts to emphasize Soviet strength have often accompanied Moscow's attempts to engender Western support for negotiations.

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\* Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence.

1. This combination of promise and threat was manifested as early as 1954, when the Paris agreements to rearm West Germany under NATO were being ratified in the West. While calling for talks on European security and holding out the prospect of fruitful negotiations, the Soviets in November 1954 convened a conference of bloc states in Moscow which warned the West that ratification of the Paris agreements would be countered by joint military organization in the East. The Moscow meeting foreshadowed the formation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955.

2. In 1955, amidst a massive Soviet propaganda campaign against the stationing of US atomic weapons in the FRG, Foreign Minister Molotov, at a Big Four foreign ministers' conference in Geneva, suggested the creation of a "zone of limitation and inspection of armaments in Europe." The zone was to include the territory of West and East Germany and "the states bordering on them, or at least certain ones of them."

3. As Soviet propaganda continued to stress the dangers to West Europe of the deployment of nuclear weapons in Germany, the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee held a meeting in January 1956. The committee called for a big-power agreement to exclude nuclear weapons from the equipment of any armies stationed in Germany, including West and East German as well as other forces.

4. The idea was reiterated by Khrushchev at the 20th party congress in February 1956, and was incorporated into the comprehensive Soviet plan presented to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee on 27 March 1956. This plan was Moscow's first formal proposal to prohibit nuclear weapons and atomic military units in a European zone.<sup>1/</sup>

5. The banning of mass destruction weapons in Germany was raised again a year later, in a Soviet - East German communiqué issued in January of 1957.<sup>2/</sup> In the same month, President Eisenhower in his budget message

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1/ It provided for limitation and inspection of armaments in Germany and unnamed "adjacent states." The banning of nuclear weapons in both parts of Germany was suggested by Moscow as a partial, interim measure to be concluded pending agreement on the entire plan.

2/ It stated that "the disarmament problem can be partially resolved by establishing a restricted armaments zone in Europe comprising both parts of Germany."



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mentioned the imminent extension of a nuclear capability to NATO and non-NATO countries by means of special US "atomic units." This prompted a round of threatening notes from Moscow to NATO countries warning them not to permit US atomic weapons on their soil.

6. In March of 1957, the Soviets sent to the UN Disarmament Subcommittee a plan almost identical with the one they had proposed the year before.<sup>3/</sup> In this plan, Moscow introduced a general provision prohibiting nuclear weapons on foreign soil. Neither the 1957 Soviet plan nor its earlier versions, however, gave details on the implementation of a nuclear weapons ban in a zone of limitation, nor were they explicit on the question of the production of nuclear weapons in the proposed zone.

7. The first explicit suggestion for outlawing the production of nuclear weapons in a European zone (in this instance both parts of Germany) came in a speech by East German leader Walter Ulbricht in April 1957 (see Annex I). The proposal was formally endorsed by the USSR in notes to West Germany later in April and again early in September 1957. Late in September, Moscow presented to the UN General Assembly a memorandum calling for a ban on placing nuclear weapons "at the disposal of any other states or commands of military blocs."

8. Until the Rapacki Plan was put forward at the UN in October 1957, the proposals for establishing an atom-free zone had made specific mention only of West and East Germany. The Soviets agreed to the Rapacki proposal for a zone to include both Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and to the principle of controls and inspection within the zone. They did not actively support the plan until December, however, and did not expect it to be accepted by the West. Khrushchev was convinced that Bonn would never agree to it, but thought it could be made more attractive to the West--and thus more effective in stalling a nuclear build-up in West Europe--if it were expanded to include other countries. Some friction

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3/ It also provided for a "zone of limitation" in Europe encompassing the territory of "both parts of Germany and that of states adjoining them." Within such a zone "the stationing of atomic military formations or any form of atomic or hydrogen weapons" would be prohibited and joint inspection "of the armed forces and armaments of the states parties to the agreement" would be instituted.

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reportedly developed between the USSR and Poland over this point. Moscow decided early in 1958 to advocate an extension of Rapacki's nuclear-free zone to include Italy, Yugoslavia, Belgium, and a large part of France.

9. Moscow's advocacy of expanding the plan was accompanied, however, by heavy-handed hints that the USSR intended to match any Western moves by equipping East European forces with new weapons. The Soviets offered to agree to an atom-free zone as a step independent of other kinds of demilitarization, but did so in combination with a series of increasingly explicit threats to retaliate within the Warsaw Pact for any nuclear build-up in the FRG. Thus Moscow's support for the Rapacki proposal again was aimed at delaying Western plans for West Germany by raising pressure within the Western alliance for another try at a settlement with the Soviets.

10. A revised version of the original plan, designed to meet Western objections, was offered by Rapacki on 4 November 1958 (see Annex II).

11. The Rapacki Plan then lay largely dormant until September 1960 when it was revived by party boss Gomulka before the UN. An expanded and more detailed version of the plan was then presented formally at the 17-nation disarmament conference in Geneva on 28 March 1962 as an integral part of Soviet disarmament proposals.

12. Disappointed at the fate of the Rapacki plan, and possibly alarmed at some evidence of Soviet approaches to West Germany in the fall of 1963, Polish party boss Gomulka unveiled his own version of the Polish disarmament proposals in a speech on 28 December 1963. The "Gomulka Plan" was formally presented to the Western powers in a Polish memorandum of 29 February 1964 (see Annex III).

13. Throughout the public and private exchanges between Poland and the West concerning the several Polish initiatives, the Poles have sought to meet a major Western objection by privately stressing that their proposals do not require Western recognition of East Germany. Although both the Rapacki and the Gomulka plans include East Germany in the proposed disarmament zone, neither plan specifically calls for East Germany to be party to all negotiations.

14. This factor appears to have been one of the main issues of contention between the Poles, the East Germans, and the USSR. In January 1964, a few days following Gomulka's unveiling of his plan, Khrushchev--probably at East German prodding--spoke of a similar Soviet proposal which took due cognizance of the Pankow regime, and reiterated the concept of three German entities: East and West Germany, and West Berlin.

15. Apparently to supplement the Polish partial disarmament proposals at a time when these were not actively pushed, Foreign Minister Rapacki proposed a general East-West conference on European security during a speech to the UN on 12 December 1964.<sup>4/</sup>

16. Soviet propaganda has continued to mention European security, but Moscow has been content merely to express its willingness to discuss any proposals that might be forthcoming. The idea of convening a conference on the subject was revived in general terms by the Soviets this spring, but they did not specify clearly when or among whom such a conference should be held. Brezhnev raised the idea in his address at the 23rd party congress in March. Reference to some kind of summit gathering on European security was also made by Foreign Minister Gromyko during his trip to Rome in April.

17. Brezhnev's 31 May address at the Czech party congress and Premier Kosygin's 8 June election speech contain references to European security but with no specific proposals and no call for a conference. Kosygin said in a 17 June speech in Helsinki that Moscow wants an all-European conference.

18. Kosygin observed that "a stable system of security in Europe cannot be created without the interests of the Soviet Union being taken into account." Brezhnev called for the replacement of military alliances with the peaceful cooperation of all states, and alluded

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4/ The Polish proposal envisaged the participation of the US in any such conference. Subsequent Soviet and East European support for the Polish idea omitted references to US participation. The Poles have continued privately to indicate, however, that the exclusion of the US would be unrealistic. They have also largely sought to keep the proposal from becoming a mere propaganda issue, and have indirectly indicated that preliminary talks on a non-governmental level between East and West could be held prior to any formal conference.

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to "the many proposals (of the socialist states) directed toward the strengthening of peace in Europe," which "as a whole....comprise a broad, practicable program which should be seriously discussed by statesmen in the West." Brezhnev also noted that "several other European states" have ideas about strengthening peace in Europe, ideas which include, according to Brezhnev, nonaggression pacts or exchanges of appropriate declarations. Both he and Kosygin said that the USSR has been giving "much attention" to the problem of European security.

19. Over the past several years the Soviets also have on many occasions raised the issue of a nonaggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The USSR has sometimes broached the subject in the context of European security and sometimes as a possible "partial" disarmament measure which would facilitate agreement on general and complete disarmament. During the negotiations on the partial test ban treaty in the summer of 1963, the Soviets strongly urged agreement on a NATO - Warsaw Pact nonaggression treaty to accompany the partial test ban agreement. Since that time the Soviets have not pressed the issue, but a revival of the proposal cannot be ruled out.

20. During his trip to Finland 13-18 June, Kosygin said "the guaranteeing of peace in Europe is the business of all European states," and noted that Moscow has taken the initiative in calling for an all-European conference to discuss questions concerning European security.

21. Moscow again has been pursuing dual tactics, fostering the impression that it is willing to engage in fruitful talks on outstanding problems of European security, while threatening "appropriate countermeasures" if Bonn gains access to nuclear weapons. The issue of West Germany's role in NATO nuclear affairs is of paramount concern to the Soviets. Moscow undoubtedly calculates that disunity in the Western alliance can be exploited in a manner that will produce pressure from West Europe on Washington and Bonn to abandon plans for an FRG nuclear role rather than prejudice the prospects of detente with Russia.

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ANNEX I

Ulbricht Speech of April 1957

In the wake of reports that Bonn might be moving toward independent production, Ulbricht proposed:

- (a) cessation of all propaganda and all preparations for atomic war on German territory;
- (b) joint agreement of both German governments on the outlawing of atomic bombs and on reciprocal renunciation of the production of atomic weapons; and
- (c) joint agreement, or separate pledges, to strive for a ban upon the stationing of atomic guns and other atomic weapons on German soil.

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ANNEX II

Rapacki Plan of November 1958

The principal modification lay in a two-fold staging of the original proposals:

- (a) The first stage would involve in essence a freezing of nuclear armaments in the proposed zone. A ban would be introduced on the production of nuclear weapons by the states within the zone, and an obligation would be undertaken by them to renounce equipping with nuclear weapons those armies which do not yet possess them and "building the installations" for them. Appropriate measures of control would be introduced.
- (b) The second stage would be preceded by talks on the appropriate reduction of conventional forces. Such a reduction would be implemented simultaneously with the complete de-nuclearization of the zone, and again would be accompanied by appropriate measures of control.

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ANNEX III

Gomulka Plan of February 1964

- (a) A freezing of nuclear and thermonuclear armaments would be instituted in a zone including "in principle" the territories of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany, with the respective territorial waters and air space. This zone could be subsequently expanded through the accession of "other European states."
- (b) Appropriate supervision and safeguards should be established, including control by mixed commissions composed of representatives of the Warsaw Pact and of NATO on a parity basis.
- (c) Parties whose armed forces stationed in the zone have access to nuclear weapons would hold periodic meetings to exchange all information necessary to implement their obligations under the nuclear freeze.

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ANNEX IV

Polish "Baltic Sea of Peace" Proposal of June 1957

The "Baltic Sea of Peace" proposal, originally put forward in June 1957 by Poland, but probably of Soviet origin, envisaged the conclusion of nonaggression treaties among the littoral states of the Baltic Sea, and the closing of the sea to warships of other powers. Possibly prompted by the 1957 NATO decision to establish missile bases in Western Europe, the proposal was accompanied by Soviet propaganda emphasizing the danger such bases entailed for the Scandinavian countries. Poland generally stressed the regional aspects of the plan. The proposal has not been actively pushed since, and has degenerated into an annual observance of the "Baltic Sea Days" designed principally to propagandize East German - Polish - Soviet solidarity in the area.

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